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The Hebrew Bible is not a pure religious document or a de-facto
record of history. Rather, it is close to a political document
intertwined with religious and economic aspects of life. Anthropologically
speaking, politics is an intrinsic part of human story, where
all aspects of human life are interconnected and interdependent
(Gottwald, 7-31). For example, human beings need physical protection
and security, psychological balance, cultural comfortableness,
political power, and religious myths to account for their socio-cultural,
economic, and religious life experience. Human life is part of
this web of various power networks such as economy, religion,
and politics. “Political” has to do with power that can run a
society or a state toward the benefits of interested groups. In
this sense of broadly conceived politics, the main concerns have
to do with who got more power, political, and economic.
In this report, I make three important points to support
for my claim that the Hebrew Bible is essentially a political
document.
First, historical narrative of the Hebrew Bible
is not a pure record of what really happened; rather, it has history
of composition or redaction in light of later writers’ interpretive
agendas or concerns (McNutt, 5). In other words, they reinterpret
the past in light of their life experience of exile for example.
The main concerns have to do with how to reconstruct their state
once again like the Davidic Kingdom. During the Persian period when Nehemiah led people to rebuild the
wall of Jerusalem, he and his group of people were interested in building their identity
based on the picture of Davidic Kingdom’s glory
in Jerusalem, not in any other place. Throughout this, the basic claim is that
Jerusalem is the only
godly royal place where the temple is a symbol of God’s presence
and protection. Jerusalem is superior, and that people need protection from all sorts of peril
or foreign threats. This sort of royal ideology emphasizes people’s
obedience to the high priests, political and religious leaders,
to fulfill the dream of once-again-powerful Davidic Kingdom. This way of social, political order demands certainly many sacrifice
from ordinary people, for example, mobilizing economic resources
to serve that purpose.
In fact, this royal ideology derives from a
political interest that Davidic Kingdom should
be more blessed and powerful so that people might follow the royal
court. Narratives of kings and royal courts are in itself political
stories intertwined with religious claims as such, for example,
that God ordains only kings, priests, and prophets, all of whom
are the upper-class leading people. Actually, we cannot know how
ordinary people responded to the royal ideology as such. What
we can safely say is this: the historical narrative is one side
of a political story without knowing or listening to the other
part of story, which is from ordinary people in their daily lives.
So, in this sense the narrative of the
Hebrew Bible is one-sided political story (Gottwald, 31-112).
Despite the lacking of ordinary people’s life in the Hebrew Bible,
the Hebrew Bible is a political document because very political
interests are evidently shown in the relationship between their
(later writers or editors) historical reconstructions and their
later political concerns (or ideological interests).
Second, anthropologically speaking, human beings
involve holistic aspects of life, which means all human activities
are one way or another politically embedded in them even though
most people are not conscious of such politically motivated interests.
Furthermore, an anthropological line of thought pushes us to relate
to sociological approach to the text. Sociological and anthropological
insights may suggest that human beings live in connections with
others, cooperating for some time, conflicting at other times,
and still negotiating with one another, for standing in a better
position, economically or religiously. Politics is not a separate entity that stands
on its own. Rather, politics should be understood on a continuum
interacting with other components of life reality such as religion,
culture, economy, etc (Gottwald, 7-31). From this logic, human
beings are not naturally born but made, and formed, through this
kind of power games to have better positions. Now let me take
an example from the Hebrew Bible to show these aspects of anthropological
and sociological interactions of powers. Amos the prophet of 8th
century BCE is concerned about social justice and accuses the
wealthy and powerful leaders for lacking it. Amos further asks
for a kind of national repentance. His sheer critique comes from
his understanding of social, anthropological, holistic view of
life. Religious life or religion is not about mere festivals or
offerings. Rather, religion should be truly political and economic
to the extent that all resources should be shared
with each other. Amos clearly attacks the royal ideology of the
status quo: the rich become richer, and the poor become poorer.
Lastly, the Hebrew Bible is (or should be) political
from the life context today because text is not automatically
telling any thing to us unless it can be interpreted through the
life experience of readers (Gottwald, 30). From the postmodern
sensitivity to the ethical issues such as growing economic disparity,
the degrading of human life, dualistic life orientation, and games
of world powers, I, as a reader and interpreter of the text, the
Hebrew Bible in this case, am very much conscious of who I am,
just like Amos in his own time. My own view, together with many
others who share similar ideas or concerns about this world, life
and God, causes me to read the Hebrew Bible as part of human story.
The Hebrew Bible is a rather complex mix of mud, sand, stones,
and some jewels as well. What I can find from the Bible is therefore
to find me in dialogue with the text, always looking at me as
part of the world – so holistic, interconnected and interdependent
with each other.
In conclusion, the Hebrew Bible is both religious
and political. At the same time, it is part of human story
told by few elites of Israel (supporting for the cause of religious, political leaders). As ideological product, the important task for
the reconstruction of ancient Israel should
begin with the question of whose text. Who addresses what, how
and why is an important first job to do. In fact, there is not
a single author or editor in the Hebrew Bible. Many writers in
many different times with many different ideas or concerns were
involved in reinterpretations of their past and the present, with
their own voices, sometime conflicting with each other. But conflicts
and diversity of the Hebrew Bible is welcome precisely because
the Hebrew Bible is political in nature as part of human story,
as Israelites (a few) struggled to find meaning of life in their
time and place. In this regard, the Hebrew Bible does not cease
to be a living political document whose main characteristics have
to do with a sense of life in this world, in a continuum basis
both through history and the current space here now.
Was
monarchic Israel an agrarian
state? Identify the pros and
cons regarding such a characterization
Monarchic Israel beginning in the eleventh century BCE emerged
with various contributing elements, among which the most reasonable
base would be agrarian production of surpluses. Another important
element has to do with the state security in face of the foreign
invasions and threats, the fact of which demands strong military
leadership ( Lenski, 196). In fact, the
emergence of monarchy is not accidental; rather, it was a response
to both internal and external business: internal one can be population
growth, the use of agrarian technology advancement (the metallurgy),
complex social stratification; external one can be active efforts
of foreign conquest, thereby bringing into the home state more
land and wealth.
I contend that monarchic Israel was possible through agrarian
surpluses and furthermore the agrarian production system was
strengthened with the help of the monarchy’s protection
from the foreign threats and with her administration power across
the state. It should be noted, however,
that agrarian surpluses did not seem to go directly to peasants;
rather, they went to urban communities, landowners, and to the
political elite ( Lenski, 210). Put differently,
the agrarian basis was a motivating force to political, military
leaders who could easily accumulate their wealth in terms of land
and production. The land becomes a primary source of wealth. So,
power and wealth go side by side.
First, let us see
the internal business. Population growth required more production
to feed people and more land to live in. This is a big burden
socio-economically. But the right time
introduction of the metallurgy helped to increase agrarian production,
and on the other hand, the monarchic Israel brought
more land through military conquests by David. In return, the
ruler has a stronger power basis in a state. This business is
mutual: population growth was met by more land with high production; a central power,
politically, economically, and ideologically, uses this strong
basis of agrarian surpluses. On the other matter, in fact, the
metallurgy and population growth supported for military campaigns
through weapons and human resource.
Agrarian surpluses
and the monarchy’s close control of agrarian business resulted
in complex social stratification, which called for the strong
leadership, thus a form of monarchy (Finklestein,
46-47). Economic surpluses made room for other people to live
with. So, for example, those are middlemen,
traders, craftsmen, soldiers, urban officials, scribes, and
priests. The ruler should handle all this social stratification.
Second, as noted before, the external
business furthered to secure both monarchy and agrarian based
production. The Philistine, the Ammonites, and the Amalekites, attacked and bothered Israel,
and that is why Israel needed a strong military based leader. On the other hand, the internal
problem of population growth with the demand of more land was solved through the military conquests of David. From this
perspective, military conquests have double points: political
power base establishment, internally and externally, and economic
power establishment through more land and production.
Seen from the above reasoning, it seems to be
clear that a socio-economic and political analysis can help
us understand how the monarchy emerged in connection with agrarian
based production. There are many strong points to account for
the relationship between the monarchic Israel and
the agrarian business. If I reiterate again, the pros of such
characterization lie in the fact that the monarchic interests
were matched by agrarian based production
system where wealth is expressed through the size of the land.
Internal and external matters were most effectively
handled through the strong monarchic leadership under
which complex social classes were to be in check. God ordained
this monarchy of Israel,
beginning with Saul, through a central religious figure, Samuel.
It can be said that at this point of the emergence of monarchy
a religiously central figure Samuel supports the central power
of the king Saul, who would be expected to bring into Israel
more land and wealth. But he did not go along well with Samuel
(a sort of power game between a politician and a religious man),
and eventually Samuel erects David as a king, who was so powerful
in the fighting fields, and satisfied Samuel and Israelites
by expanding her territories, which have to do with socio-economic
reasons mentioned before. My point is simply that Israelite
religion at this time supported for a cause of a strong state,
militarily and economically.
What are the cons
of this characterization with an agrarian state of the monarchic
Israel?
We do not know how much Israelites
progressed in terms of technological advancement like the metallurgy.
In other words, we do not have any clear archaeological evidence
pointing to an agrarian state as such. In addition, we cannot
know how other forms of life were available in this time of
monarchy, with some portion of population engaged in non-agricultural
fields. Overall, in light of the socio-economic, political,
and ideological analysis, the best conclusion is that the monarchic
Israel derives
from agrarian based production system.
Why
is the city-state a political/economic option
for the period of Late Bronze and Iron-I in Syro-Palestine?
This
period of time can be characterized by a political, economic
reconfiguration of the states (nations) largely due to two
elements: 1) the collapse of the big empires (Egypt, the Hittites)
brings about the emergence of the new nations such as monarchies
of Aramean, Ammonite, Moabite, and
Israelite; 2) agricultural production surpluses due to the
metallurgy, for example (Ahlstrom,
218; 334). For the political and military purpose, the city-state is a better
form with which the city-state can efficiently administer
her people living in complex social stratification, and can
train soldiers in fortified cities (Finklestein, 47). Eventually, the developed urban centers
with a military, administrative function, can be the best
form to defend her nation and furthermore to make a military
campaign against the neighboring nations (Finklestein,
44-45). Economically, this period witnesses an enormous change
of social and cultural life patterns: for example, from nomadic
to sedentary life, from simple, rural life to complex social
life, which does not mean the absence of rural life or villages.
In fact, economically, the basis of this change lies in the
agricultural production of surpluses, which could make room
for additional economic activities such as making crafts or
tools. I will point out these two elements in more detail
to relate to the necessity of the city-state in this period.
First of all, the city-state
presupposes the power concentration of military leaders (chieftains)
or kings, who give service to landowners by defending her
land or extending her border, and in return, maintaining their
positions as chieftains, or kings later in monarchies. This
power center in the cities actually serves the kings and the
upper class as such. In other words, the city-state plays
a role of securing their benefits by effectively defending
their nation against the neighboring nations’ invasions such
as the Philistines or Ammonites or sometimes by expanding
their land. The power center means that the city has all resources
for kings in terms of wealth and the political elite. Also
in the city-state, in case of emergency, a military commander-in-chief
(a king) can easily make use of all resources: soldiers, foods,
and the intelligence of the elite. On the other side of political
necessity of the city-state, political control should
be mentioned because the nation is now much more complex
than before, in its social stratification: slaves, peasants,
landowners, artisans, traders, scribes, palace officials,
soldiers, and priests. The city-state should intervene in
possible conflicting situations to maintain the status quo
of the social strata. In this regard, the city-state with
the political elite can give a legislative form to control
this status quo. By way of summary, it should
be noted that the political necessity of the city-state
in this period should be found both in an external and internal
business. “External” has to do with a military purpose that
serves eventually the kings and the upper class (the urban
elite and the landowners). “Internal” has to do with matters
related to administration.
Second, economically,
the city-state is both an outcome of agricultural surpluses
and a cause of the strengthening of the agricultural business.
It is quite reasonable to think of the city-state as the result
of population growth and agrarian based economy. The city-state
cannot exist without economic support, and in this regard,
the agrarian surpluses helped the city-state to survive and
maintain her political system (Holladay, 379). Conversely, the city-state also can help to build stronger
agrarian production through protecting the land from foreign
invasions or from local disputes, and at times through widening
her territories, which can be used as the land for production; the land is a primary
source of wealth. The other aspect of economic necessity of
the city-state can be found in its
role of a facilitator as an economic booster, building roads
through which intra and inter-regional trade was made easy
and prosperous. When society becomes larger and complex, the
high demand for various products arises. So,
the city-state can control some of products so that all the
state could gain limited products. Otherwise, there might
be day-to-day fighting between different economic entities:
for example, between grain producers and pottery makers.
Drawing on Israelite
politics and economics in this period, Saul can
be perceived as a military and political leader, who
fought against Philistines and Ammonites and had to satisfy
local landowners’ interests by protecting them against foreign
invasions. That is why Saul was supported
and enthroned by the priest Samuel. For the task of
this military job, the power center in the city is
needed to Saul.
In conclusion, the
emergence of the city-state should be understood
in the process of monarchies where political and economic
necessity for strong statehood arises. As mentioned before,
the city-state has all resources: wealth, elites, public space
and facilities. In this way, the power-centered state could
best function militarily, politically, and economically for
the kings and the upper class.
Why
is the tenor of the Succession Narrative against
David When
his rise to power had been so supportive of him?
There
are two different portrayals of King David in the Hebrew
Bible. 1 Chronicle (10-29) depicts
him as an ideal king through omitting the problematic of
David’s career, not mentioning the entire story of David’s
rise to power (ABD): for example, there is no mention of
stories about his sons’ coups and about his adultery with
Bathsheba. But the so-called Succession Narrative (found
in 2 Sam. 7 – 1 Kings 2) presents David as a legitimate,
divinely chosen king on the one hand, but at the same time
reveals his weaknesses through his involvement of sinning
with Bathsheba and also from his sons’ military coups. The
former view (1 Chronicle) makes a “perfect” David at the
sacrifice of sort of traditional material (or tradition),
which preserves still ideological but partial picture of
socio-political struggles within the context of formative
monarchy of Israel. In other words, David should be understood
through the lens of political power games, which involved
David himself and his sons, including military commanders
and religious elites such as high priests and the prophets
(McKenzie, 1-5).
My answer to the question
of this paper is twofold. One is to find the answer from
the socio-political reality of David’s time and his political
role as a king, who was involved directly or indirectly
around the issues of who will succeed him. In other words,
the tenor of succession narrative goes against David simply
because it really happened in the milieu of political power
games, simply telling of David’s aggressive character and
deeds as a military leader and a king who had to gain the
public support, while suppressing the opponents whoever
they are. The result of all these struggles culminates in
Solomon’s enthronement, which needed justification and legitimization
of his gaining power. The other side of the answer comes
from the literary perspective of later editors (possibly
deuteronomistic historians) who
view the past in light of their exile experience, thus making
history understandable to later people. In this context,
the fundamental theme of these deuteronomists’ theology
can be summarized in the system of reward and punishment
where the current exile as a result
of punishment was interpreted through the sins of Israelites.
That is why the inherited material or tradition of David’s
succession with negative elements seemed to be allowable
for them from this vantage point of “reward and punishment.”
In a sense, David was already pictured enough to be a divinely
chosen royal king in the whole narrative. In fact, Even
Solomon is pictured as a king who was not loyal to God, eventually,
by importing foreign gods and culture. This also can
be understood in the same vein for these historians.
Now let me go to this twofold answer one by one.
First
of all, David himself took power through military
careers and the support of local Judean people, confronting
Saul militarily. First becoming a king of Hebron and later
of all Israel, David’s careers was full of military wars
and his achievement, which consequently brought about political
rivalry or some conflicts (Ahlstrom,
1993). In light of David’s career as such, he seemed to
have many foes within and outside the royal circle (Frick,
Semeia 37). Within the royal circle
come first Amnon and Absalom,
who raged a coup against David though they failed.
In later David’s life he faced an issue of who would succeed him. The strong
candidate was Adonijah supported
by Davidic line officials, for example, by Abithar
the priest and Joab the military commander. But
a new sort of coup against Adonijah
had been prepared by Solomon, Zadok
the priest and Nathan the prophet. The result was that Solomon
made success, becoming a king and purging all opponents.
So, Solomonic regime as a historical
winner of succession stories could possibly tell of the
story for the ultimate favor of Solomon and his comrades.
This is power of history writers. Wisdom says the winner
makes history. From the victors’ point of view, David, in
spite of his royal enthronement as a divine choice, does
not surpass Solomon. In many ways, Solomon is better pictured
than David is. A typical example is related with building of the temple, whose episode makes
Solomon be more powerful with divine favoritism.
Second, from the later
historians’ point of view, David’s succession material or
tradition seemed to bother their understanding of David
as a perfect king without major defects, as 1
Chronicle narrates so. But these historians (deuteronomists) seem to accept the tradition
(here the tradition understood as the succession narrative
found in 2 Sam. 7 – 1 Kings 2) even though the narrative
in general is intertwined with a royal theology and politics.
For deuteronomists the weaknesses of David and his sins
rightly explains the cause of weak kingdoms (later divided
into two) and eventual fall of the nations. Furthermore,
for their eyes, as far as David repents his sins, David
is no more a weak king in a sense; rather, he becomes a
model of king who is weak but strong, because deuteronomists
view history from the realized sinful result of exile experience.
In conclusion, this succession
narrative vividly testifies to the aspects of sociopolitical
life in the time of formative monarchy under which power
concentration takes place through power struggles shown
in David and his sons (McNutt, 133). David’s story with
successive Solomon’s represents the characteristics of socio-political
formation of monarchy through the centralization of power
in Jerusalem and the
royal court.
Is
it appropriate to speak of an ancient Southwestern Asian
royal ideology?
An
ancient Southwestern Asian royal ideology exists through
literatures, buildings, and political and religious practices,
primarily aiming at legitimizing and maintaining royal
power. Usual royal propaganda emphasizes the “benefits
of peace, security and wealth” for the
people (Whitelam, 121). In return,
the royal powers require people to obey to the center
or the royal bureaucracy. In so doing, the royal powers
use various ways to perpetuate such ideology to the populace,
for example, through religious symbolism (the temple,
the robes of kings or priests, various
rituals), literatures and buildings (palaces, fortified
cities). According to archaeological data, the Solomonic buildings at Meggido,
Hazor and Gezer express
power of monarchy through impressive gates for example
(Whitelam, 133).
Socio-politically and anthropologically viewed, royal ideology finds
its place everywhere not just in the ancient Southwestern Asia. The recent
Korean political history evidently shows a connection
with the ancient Southwestern Asia, differently
but similarly in nature. After a success of military coup
in 1961, Jung-Hee Park had managed Korea with a policy of stick and carrot for almost two decades until his
assassination by one of his close political friends. His
carrot includes sweet things such as wealth, security,
and peace. This carrot policy made sense to most of the
people because the nation
needed economic development and peace
and security, confronting North Korea. He changed the constitution and laws, demolished students’ protests,
while appealing to the public with carrot. He identified
himself with the poor through his physical image and asked
for their support. As an elementary student long ago,
I still remember when our teacher proudly told us that
the great president Park announced a new reform movement
called “yooshin,” literally meaning “renewal.” Actually, this
new movement further curtailed freedom of people, making
propaganda of unity and efficiency; otherwise, his royal
bureaucracy brainwashed our people with the threat of
the North Korean invasion. Furthermore, mainline religious leaders, both from Buddhism
and Christianity (but mainly Christians), implicitly supported
Park’s rule through religious rituals such prayer gatherings
at the royal palace. As Mcnutt distinguishes between “central” prophets and “peripheral”
prophets (McNutt, 181), these Korean religious leaders
certainly function as “central” figures in supporting
Park as a charismatic leader whereas some dissenting religious
leaders risked their life by challenging Park’s policy
and ideology. Examined further, the relationship between
the royal bureaucracy (Park’s court) and religious circles
that participated in the royal ideology demonstrates their
mutual, beneficial relationship given the socio-political
situation in Korea. By
supporting Park’s government ideology, the pro-government
religious leaders and their religious institutions received
various financial benefits plus political privileges.
In fact, many people chose to believe Park’s political
propaganda as such. I think this Korean political story
help me understand the ancient society. In the following
I will show in more detail why the royal ideology existed
throughout the ancient Southwestern Asia including Israel.
As Whitelam
suggests, royal ideology emerged from internal and external
pressures. Internal ones mainly have to do with the heterogeneous
social groups, and external ones
with the “re-emerging powers to the north and south” (Whitelam, 119). Whitelam also points
out the opposition force among the urban elites who confront
the royal power. To deal with these matters, the royal
power needed ideological support from the people, appealing
to religious symbols, religious practices, and religious
royal ideology that a king plays the role of a divine
agent (or divine in Egypt) as shown in royal psalms (psalms
45; 89; 101; 110) (Whitelam,
132). The Israelite Temple functions at the center of royal ideology, which affirms a king as
a divine choice, and also appeals
to the public mind through symbolic presence of the God
(De Vaux, 112). Merriam’s notion
of Miranda and credenda in politics makes sense in the
function of the temple, because Miranda as an emotional
appeal could represent the visible features of the temple,
and Credenda as a rational resort points to the actual
practice of temple sacrifices and other festivals through
which God provides sanctity and daily necessities for
all people. Interestingly enough, the first Roman emperor
Augustus also used a similar strategy by erecting many
monuments celebrating his own achievements with divine
connection, and at the same time delivering a political
message of peace and prosperity to the public. Similarly,
Park also built national monuments calling for unity,
and furthermore he himself made a song (not an anthem)
to deliver a political message of peace and prosperity.
The song title “song of renewal” typically shows such
a connection with the notion of Miranda. Furthermore,
Park’s royal writers wrote books about Park’s legacy and
his heroic qualities as a man and a president, as Virgil
in Rome wrote Aeneid for Augustus in the
first century BCE.
In conclusion, though
the context and reality of ancient society differ from
culture to culture together with a variety of ways of
doing royal ideology, as Frankfort observes different
forms of kingship in Egypt, Mesopotamia and Israel, an
essential need for royal ideology does not really differ:
a king as a head of the nation state must reign as a guarantor
of peace and justice while asking for total obedience
to the rule of law (Frankfort, 342; McNutt, 172; De Vaux, 108-111). In this way
the royal bureaucracy gains the upper hand manipulating
the state business and enjoys all power. Especially in
chaos situations like wars in ancient Southwestern Asia, royal ideology
can easily drive people to cooperate with the royal court
and bureaucracy (Talmon, 67).
The rise of state
or monarchy has to do with a kind of mutual contract
between the state and the populace though such a contract
does not equal a modern sense of democracy. This sense
of a contract begins with common interests between kings
and the populace. In other words,
in the 10th century BCE down to the 9th
century (during the formation of the state), the populace
needed security and peace from foreign invasions (externally)
and from local conflicts due to land scarcity and population
growth. For the peace and security, the populace
needs a strong centralized government that can effectively
defend the state and administer all local conflicts
whether of political or economical. This need from the
populace gives powers to the royal court. In fact, the
Law of the king (Deut. 17:14-20) and the Statute of the king (1 Sam. 8:11-16)
demonstrate both the rationale of the monarchy and the
need for it. The former law emphasizes a kind of binding
relationship between the king and God, and between the
king and the people in such way that the king would
have to serve them (sense of mutual service). The latter
law lists what the king should require the people to
perform royal duties such as defending the nation: taxation,
conscription, labor, etc.
But in reality not all people of Israel agree
to the idea of monarchy. Typical opposing groups come
from the local provinces or villages where traditional
tribal leaders lost power or significant benefits due
to the centralization of power. Moreover, the chances
of usurping within the royal court increase. So
in this context the king need to legitimize the royal
power with every means as possible.
I
will answer the week’s question with a sense of “treasure
out of the sand” by which I mean that good and bad coexists
in royal ideologies and their legitimization of the
power. On the one hand, civil or religious legitimization
of the state and the kingship would benefit both parties
(the royal court and the populace) in certain areas
as the aforementioned laws likely reflect such orientation
of the mutual interests, and on the other hand, certain
legitimization does not aim at increasing the welfare
of the populace. Evidently, certain ideologies employed
by the royal court deviate from the sense of mutual
benefits. For example, Davidic dynasty’s permanence
do not care much about the social well-being of the
populace but about political power with which the king
(the royal court) wants the dynasty to go forever at
the sacrifice of the populace.
The
people’s beneficial packages through civil or religious
legitimization of the state and kingship include enforcing
of justice, building of defense against foreign invasions,
controlling of local politics (conflicts) and economics,
and reforming of cultic (religious). Except the last
one of the list (reforming of the cultic), the packages
consist of civil services that legitimize the royal
power as such. Clearly, the populace would desperately
need protection (peace) than insecurity by wars. But
examined further, these packages end up with much more
benefits for the royal courts and the bureaucracy. For
example, economically, they have much better positions
than the general populace most of whom live on the farms.
The
civil legitimization of the enlargement of Jerusalem, various
building projects, taxation, and conscription burdensomely
pushes the populace to accept them. Taxation and conscription
directly affect a national defense program, but the
enlargement of Jerusalem or various building projects do not seriously show the urgency in
defense. More or less, these latter things have more
to do with ideological forces, which display magnificence
of the buildings and the royal court. Solomon’s palace
falls into a category of the negative effect on the
populace, demanding many natural and human resources
for the building project.
Now
moving to religious legitimization of the state and
kingship, I can find more of the problematic to the
populace than the positive, which means the king receives
almost all benefits through the so-called royal ideologies:
the king as a divine agent (or favorite) with divine
character plus a Davidic lineage of royal kingdom centering
in Jerusalem. All these claims directly serve the royal
court rather than the populace. Because of this emphasis
on hierarchical divine power, the populace has to sacrifice
for supporting them: conscription, taxation, unequal
distribution of power and economic surpluses. Put it
differently, the religious royal ideologies legitimize
the unequal relationship of people, not just of the
royal court and the people, but also of different social
classes. For my view, religious claims directed to the
legitimization of the state and the king has more interest
in establishing and securing the royal court. Especially,
Solomon put lots of energy doing this sort of legitimization.
For example, he built a gorgeous temple and worked hard
to justify his enthronement as shown in the Succession
Narrative. Nathan’s prophecy of Davidic dynasty’s superiority
and the centralization of Jerusalem as the only
cultic place clearly show the royal court’s inclination
to maintenance of power.
Organization
Chart of Solomon's Administration (PDF): click
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Patronage
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Gender,
Class, and the Social-scientific Study of Genesis
2-3
"Lex
Talionis in Exod 21:22-25: Its Origin and Context,"
Journal
of Hebrew Scriptures Volume 6: Article 3 (2006);
also appears in Perspectives on Hebrew Scriptures
III edited by Ehud Ben Zvi, Gorgias Press, 2007.
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